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Abstract
There seems to exist a co-relation between fiscal rules and fiscal balances in the EU, namely during the 
period between the end of the 1970s and the mid-1990s, there were actually no fiscal rules and European 
accumulated debt to GDP ratio increased steadily. However, during the period between the mid-1990s 
and 2008, when the “Stability and Growth Pact” was introduced, the ratio declined. In the past several 
years, after the Pact was in reality relaxed, again the ratio increased.
 In democratic societies, like the EU and Japan, there appears to be strong biases towards budgetary 
deficits, as politicians have to pay special attentions to voters in their constituencies. Therefore, in 
order to introduce fiscal disciplines and to reduce budgetary deficits, introductions of fiscal rules might 
be effective. 
Key words; budgetary deficit, accumulated debt, Stability and Growth pact, Fiscal Compact, European 
Semester
JEL classification numbers: H30, H60, O52, P50
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1. Introduction
The Japanese government raised its consumption tax rate from 5 percent to 8 percent in 
April 2014. Considering the rapid deterioration of Japan’s fiscal performance, increasing 
the tax burden on its consumers seems to be unavoidable as Japan’s ratio of accumulated 
debt to its GDP reached as high as 220 percent in 2013, the highest among major OECD 
countries. Why has the Japanese fiscal balance deteriorated to such a considerable extent? 
In contrast, despite the Euro crisis, which was triggered by default risks for national bonds 
of some EU member state, the same ratio for the EU has improved. In this paper, we will 
compare fiscal performances in the EU, some EU member states, and Japan by focusing on 
fiscal rules, which might be effective tools for introducing fiscal discipline.
2. Overview of fiscal performances
We will firstly review two tables on recent fiscal performances in the EU and Japan; ratios 
of budgetary deficits to GDP and ratios of accumulated debts to GDP. As is seen in Table 
1, which illustrates budgetary deficits to GDP, Japan has constantly recorded a high ra-
tio, while in the EU it has steady declined to almost 3 percent in recent years. As is well 
known this 3 percent threshold is one of the criteria required by the Maastricht Treaty to 
introduce the Euro1. As a result, the EU’s budgetary deficits are not considered to be seri-
ous anymore except for Greece. The question then arises, how have they succeeded in re-
ducing their deficits?
Table 1 : Ratio of budgetary deficit to GDP (%)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
EU -6.4 -4.5 -4.2 -3.2 -3.0
 Germany -4.1 -0.9 0.1 0.1 0.2
 France -6.8 -5.1 -4.9 -4.1 -4.4
 Greece -11.1 -10.1 -8.6 -12.2 -1.6
Japan -8.3 -8.8 -8.7 -8.8 -7.5
Source; European Commission, European Economy
Nevertheless, there is still a problem, which is now causing unstable Euro exchange rates, 
as seen in recent foreign exchange markets. According to Table 1, some member states 
have comparatively high budgetary deficit to GDP ratios, while others have not. In fact, 
in 2012, Germany recorded a budgetary surplus, while the budget deficit/GDP ratios in 
Greece exceeded 10%. What are the reasons for the fiscal performance differences among 
the member states?
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Table 2 : Ratio of accumulated debt to GDP (%)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
EU 78.4 81.3 85.0 87.1 88.1
 Germany 80.3 77.6 79.0 76.9 74.5
 France 81.5 85.0 89.2 92.2 95.5
 Greece 146.0 171.3 156.9 174.9 175.5
Japan 216.0 229.8 237.3 244.0 246.1
Source; European Commission, European Economy
Next, we will examine Table 2, which demonstrates changes in the ratios of accumulated 
debts to GDP. As is clearly seen, the ratio for Japan, 246.1 percent, is the highest among 
the countries in this table. As for the member states, again there are wide differences in 
their performances. It is to be noted here that, according to the Maastricht Criteria, which 
define conditions for introducing the Euro, the ratio should be less than 60 percent.
Figure 1: Ratio of accumulated debt to GDP of the EU (%)
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Now, we will review developments in the public debts/GDP ratio of the EU as shown in 
Figure 1. As can be seen in the figure, changes in the ratio can be divided into three peri-
ods; the first from the end of the 1970s until the mid-1990s, the second from the mid-1990s 
until 2008 and the third from 2008 until recent years. The first period can be character-
ized as “steadily increasing”, and in fact the ratio rose from approximately 35 percent to 70 
percent. In the second period, on the other hand, it declined from 70 percent to almost 60 
percent. And, in the third period, when the so-called “Lehman Shock” happened, it jumped 
to the 80-90 percent level. What are the reasons behind these changes in the ratio?
　As is known, due partly to declining growth potentials, average growth rates in  mature 
economies like the EU and Japan have declined, which tends to reduce tax revenues. On 
the other hand, these areas are facing demographic changes, in the form of ageing soci-
eties, which tend to increase social security related expenditures. Therefore increasing 
budgetary deficits in these areas seem to be unavoidable. Furthermore, due to inefficient 
fiscal systems, budgetary balances steadily deteriorated as we have seen in the first pe-
riod in Figure 1. When evaluating the EU’s monetary unification, called the Economic and 
Monetary Union, the criticism is often leveled that if the flexibility of a discretionary fiscal 
policy is lost due to the “Stability and Growth Pact” 2, which will be discussed shortly, it is 
difficult to implement expansionary fiscal policy, thus exacerbating recessions. However, 
reality is somewhat different; the public debt outstanding continued and, as a result, there 
was not enough room to exercise the above Keynesian fiscal policies.
　However, in 1996, when the EU introduced the “Stability and Growth Pact”, which re-
quired fiscal discipline, the debt/GDP ratio had declined remarkably in the second period. 
It is noted that the pact imposes sanctions on member states that violate fiscal discipline 
rules. In this respect, the pact appeared to have a significant impact on the fiscal balance. 
In 2008, the “Lehman Shock” happened in the U.S., and it had profound impacts not only 
in the U.S., but also in the EU. Furthermore, due partly to the “flexible interpretation” 
of the Pact, which we will discuss later, almost all European countries seem to have lost 
financial discipline and implemented looser fiscal policies in order to mitigate the serious-
ness of this external shock.
　In more recent years, triggered by the Euro crisis, the EU has tried to implement fiscal 
discipline and as a result, fiscal performances in the EU area improved as we have seen 
in Table 1. Although various approaches and previous works on the relationship between 
fiscal rules and fiscal performances have been published, the conclusion of almost all of 
them seems to be that fiscal rules like the pact, play an important role in controlling fiscal 
performance or that fiscal rules are important factors that determine a budget deficit, es-
pecially taking the second period into consideration.
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3. Fiscal Rule Theories
Here, we will review economic works and theories which discuss fiscal performances. Ac-
cording to a Keynesian approach, governments should implement expansionary fiscal poli-
cies in recession periods, while tightening fiscal policies in boom periods, thus reducing 
business cycle swings and realizing stable economic development. However, as is seen in 
Table 1, in almost all countries and in almost all periods, budgetary balances have been 
deficits, even in boom periods. There seems to have been a deficit-bias in each country. In 
order to analyze the factors behind this fact, there have been many works and lots of dis-
cussions. Amongst these, we would firstly like to summarize the “fiscal illusion theory.” 
According to Buchanan & Wagner (1977) 3, a budget deficit tends to expand as a result 
of present expenditure preferences, since future budget constraints cannot be fully fore-
seen. Similarly, in the inter-temporal redistribution model, which Cukierman and Meltzer 
(1989) 4 and others have insisted, even if people recognize future budget constraints, pres-
ent voters will claim their current interests, sometimes in the burdens on future genera-
tions who do not have voting rights at the present.
　Next, the “common pool problem” appears to be important. According to Weingast, Shepsle 
and Johnsen (1981)5, politicians tend to prefer policies that favour people in their own con-
stituencies. It is to be noted that the funds spent for their policies are widely collected from 
the general population and are pooled as a common source of revenue.
　Under such political circumstances, the longer that a coalition government exists and 
the larger the number of political parties in the coalition that are involved, the larger the 
fiscal deficits become. This is because coalition governments tend to pay special attentions 
to each of the member parties and consequently to politicians involved in a large number 
of vested interest groups. Based on such analysis, various proposals have been made aim-
ing at budget deficit reductions. For example, according to von Hagen (1992) 6, the more 
transparency in the decision-making process, the less the budgetary deficit. This seems to 
be because politicians’ degree of freedom may be undermined. Therefore, he emphasized 
the importance of a transparent decision-making process in fiscal policy. Furthermore, 
to improve fiscal transparency Kopits and Craig (1998) insisted that fiscal transparency 
should be divided into several categories; institutional transparency, transparency in pub-
lic accounts, and transparency of indicators and projections. They also emphasized that 
each category should be more transparent7.
　According to them, establishment of an independent regulatory authority is vital in 
order to improve “institutional transparency”. The authority should be independent, and 
thus pay little attentions to voters. From that perspective, the European Commission’s in-
volvement seems to be important, since European Commissioners as well as their staff are 
required to be independent from their home country and voters there.
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　Next, regarding the “transparency of accounts”; generally, the government sector bud-
get system is very complex and it is not easy for people to assess fiscal policies. Again, the 
Commission’s staff with their deep knowledge of fiscal policy and fiscal system can play a 
role in reducing deficit bias. Moreover, “an economic index to be used and the transparency 
of prediction” has been important, as it is often observed that governments decide their 
policies based on optimistic economic forecasts, and upon appropriation requests based on 
excessive revenue hopes. Therefore, policies and their evaluation should be based on real-
istic scenarios. Since the Euro crisis, it has already been decided that the Commission can 
intervene each country’s fiscal policy decisions. We will discuss this later.
　Moreover, based on such a development, the analysis of ways of imposing rules on fiscal 
policy has become popular in recent years in order to avoid arbitrary fiscal policy, some-
times with deficit bias. According to Kopits and Symansky (1998), “a fiscal policy rule is 
a permanent constraint on fiscal policy” 8. However, which targets should be aimed for; 
budgetary balance or public debt outstanding? In fact, as was seen during the 1990s, a 
significant number of member states introduced fiscal rules, targeting mainly budgetary 
balances and debt to GDP ratios. Marneffe, van Aarle, and van der Wielen and Vereeck 
(2011), using panel data analysis, examined the Eurozone during the period 1995 to 2008 
for countries,which introduced fiscal rules9. They concluded that constraints on outstand-
ing debt and fiscal balance are effective in order to introduce fiscal discipline.
4. A Fiscal Rule Model 10
Here, we will continue to examine the effects of fiscal rules on fiscal performances by con-
structing a very simple game theory model with two countries; country G and country F. 
Both countries are member states of the EU and can enjoy various benefits (B) by forming 
the Economic Monetary Union (EMU). Reducing uncertainty of exchange rate changes 
and/or banking charges are examples of these benefits. We also suppose that the two coun-
tries can adopt two different or two opposite fiscal policies; a tight fiscal policy with disci-
pline (here called “discipline strategy”) and a loose fiscal policy with no discipline (called “no 
discipline strategy”).
　On the other hand, in order to participate in the EMU, where a fiscal discipline policy is 
required, the countries have to pay expenses or costs (C). Although various expenses can 
be considered, cutting expenditure and/or increasing the tax level are unpopular among 
people. In democratic countries, governments and politicians should consider these fiscal 
measures as a “Cost”. The net benefits that each country enjoys can be denoted by (B − C), 
as is evident. In addition, B > C should hold, otherwise neither country would participate 
in the EMU.
　Now, we will further assume that country F adopts the no discipline strategy when it 
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joins the EMU without paying costs or C, which implies that F does not reduce budgetary 
deficits. In other words, F aims at being a “free rider”, while country G adopts the disci-
pline strategy in order to observe the EMU rules. We will also suppose that the benefits of 
the EMU fall to B/2 for each country, as the two countries can share these benefits equally. 
Therefore, the net benefits for country F are considered to be 
(B/2), 
while those for country G are
(B/2 − C) 
and vice-versa as is seen in Table 3.
Table 3 : Fiscal Rule Model with no sanctions -Payoff Matrix-
Country G
Discipline No discipline
Country F Discipline B − C, B − C B/2 − C, B/2
No discipline B/2, B/2 − C 0, 0
　Moreover, although there is a case where no discipline strategies are taken, and in 
which both countries aim at being “free riders”, the monetary union would fail and neither 
country would enjoy any benefits. The payoff matrix of the game is summarized in Table 3. 
Here, suppose 
B/2 > B − C >0 > B/2 – C ……… (1)
Clearly, (1) can be simplified as
B > C > B/2. 
　As we saw earlier, it is clear that B > C holds. However, (C > B/2) means that one of the 
countries adopts the no discipline strategy and the other country’s benefits are less than 
its cost. Therefore, the other country has to adopt a similar no discipline strategy or fiscal 
policy. In such a case, the game will fall into the well-known “prisoner's dilemma.” As a re-
sult, the introduction of the common currency will fail and the EMU will collapse.
　Next, in order to make the EMU successful, we will consider the case where the EU im-
poses a fine or sanction (S) on a country that violates the fiscal discipline rule. First, we 
examine country F. Net benefits will be (B − C) if country G is assumed to have a discipline 
strategy in order to observe the rules. However, if country F adopts the no discipline strat-
egy in order to be a “free rider”, F’s net benefits are defined as (B/2 − S).
We can compare two opposite strategies by country F, 
(B − C) − (B/2 − S) = S − (C − B/2)
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If the EU decides the level of sanction to satisfy
S > C − B/2 ……… (2)
then (B − C) > (B/2 − S), 
which means that F should adopt a discipline strategy to observe the rules.
　If we suppose that G adopts a no discipline strategy and F adopts the discipline strategy, 
F’s net benefit would be
B/2 − C.
　If F also adopts no discipline strategy, then, there will be no monetary union and F’s net 
benefits will be (0 − S). We will compare F’s two different policies
(B/2 − C) − (0 − S) = S + (B/2 − C) >0 (∵ (2))
　This means that in spite of G’s strategy, F would adopt a discipline strategy. Therefore, 
in conclusion, sanctions on a country that does not observe the rules should be effective in 
making the country observe the rules and vice-versa.
Table 4 : Fiscal Rule Model with Sanctions
-Payoff Matrix- 
 
Country G
Discipline No discipline
Country F Discipline B − C, B − C B/2 − C, B/2 − S
No discipline B/2 − S, B/2 − C − S, − S
　The EU introduced the Stability and Growth Pact, which defined sanctions against coun-
tries with no discipline fiscal policy, in 1996. As we have seen in Figure 1, the EU’s debt/
GDP ratio declined significantly. We can assume that the pact had a significant impact on 
the EU or EU member states. However, due to Germany’s violation of the pact caused by 
the considerable burdens of German unification, the German budgetary deficit/GDP ratio 
exceeded the threshold set by the EU. Against such a background, the EU did not impose 
sanctions and adopted a “flexible interpretation”. Since then some member states seem to 
have lost fiscal disciplines and this became an important factor in the deterioration in fis-
cal balances since the end of 2000s which might have triggered the Euro crisis. In other 
word, fiscal rules with sanctions do have an effect.
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5. European Semester and Fiscal Compact
In order to avoid a future recurrence of the Euro crisis, the EU has implemented various 
measures, which we will examine in this section. Firstly, the EU introduced the “European 
Semester”11 starting in January, 2011. Its purpose is to improve the transparency of fis-
cal policy, and it consists of three surveillances, called macro-economic imbalance surveil-
lance, structural reform surveillance, and fiscal policy surveillance. Amongst these, macro-
economic imbalance surveillance seems to be most important. Namely, each of the member 
states has to present its “Stability and Convergence Programme” and its fiscal policy for 
the next year to the European Commission.
　The Commission evaluates the fiscal policies of the member states and will summarize 
its evaluation results by May or June each year. Then the EU Council will adopt the evalu-
ations by the end of June, or the end of the first semester. Each country can then submit 
its budget draft to its own Parliament. Thus, in the stage before budget draft decisions in 
each country, half a year (the Semester) will be spent undergoing surveillance by an in-
dependent regulatory authority, viz. the European Commission. In other words, member 
states cannot implement their own fiscal policy without obtaining consent from the EU,.
　Next, we will examine the “Fiscal Compact” 12, which took effect in January 2013, and 
25 member states, except for Great Britain and the Czech Republic, signed and introduced 
(there were 27 member states at the time of signing). However, within five years, it is due 
to be included in the legal framework of EU after effectuation. The outline of the Compact 
is as follows. The most important element is the introduction of a financial equilibrium 
rule. The signatory has to commit to balancing or moving into the surplus of the general 
government fiscal balance and has to enact this domestically. That is, the goal in the me-
dium term for each country is to reduce its ratio to GDP to less than 0.5 percent. However, 
when the public debt outstanding / GDP ratio is less than 60%, the budgetary deficit to 
GDP ratio is permitted to rise to 1 percent. In addition, this commitment is deliberated in 
the European Semester mentioned earlier.
　If a country in the EMU adopts a “no discipline” fiscal policy and violates the above con-
dition, European Court of Justice can impose a fine of 0.1 percent of GDP on the country as 
a sanction. In a sense, the compact can be regarded as a new version of the Stability and 
Growth Pact.
― 15 ―
摂南経済研究  第５巻  第１・2号（2015）
6. Conclusions
As we have seen above, there seems to be a strong co-relation between fiscal rules and fis-
cal performances in the EU. During the period from the 1970s to the mid-1990s when there 
were actually no fiscal rules, the EU’s fiscal performance had deteriorated. However, with 
the view towards the realization of the EMU, the EU introduced the Stability and Growth 
Pact which included sanctions against member states with little or no fiscal discipline. 
The EU’s accumulated public debt to GDP ratio then declined remarkably. However, fac-
ing Germany’s violation of the pact, due mainly to huge unification costs, the EU gave up 
sanctions. This had a profound impact on other member states, which had deficit biases. 
Triggered by the risk of a Greek default, the Euro faced crisis and the EU again introduced 
another fiscal rule, the European Semester and Fiscal Compact, which is again improving 
fiscal performances in the EU. If therefore,the EU would avoid sanctions on member states 
wluich violate the “Fiscal Compact” ,the EMU might fail.
　What lessons can we draw from the European experiences? Japan has not yet adopted 
fiscal rules to reduce its deficit bias. This might be one of the reasons for its deteriorating 
fiscal performance. Therefore, Japan should introduce a legal basis for rigid fiscal rules 
in exchange for the degree of freedom of fiscal policy. It should be noted that Japan has 
already significantly lost the degree of freedom of its fiscal policy, due to highest or worst 
performance and has no or little room for discretional fiscal policy. Considering European 
experiences, Japan seems to have to introduce fiscal rules, before it will raise its consump-
tion tax from current 8 percent to 10 percent, scheduled in 2017. 
1  According to the Treaty on the European Union, there are five criteria to introduce the common currency; 
the Euro. Less than 3 percent of government deficits as percent of GDP and less than 60 percent governm
ent debts as percent of GDP are two of these five criteria. The purpose of these two criteria is to ensure su
stainable public finances. See
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/adoption/who_can_join/index_en.htm 
(Accessed on Nov 3. 2014)
2 In order to ensure sustainable public finance, the EU introduced the Pact in 1996. It stipulated that the 
member states which violate fiscal rules can be fined as much as 0.5 percent of their GDP. See
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/index_en.htm
(Accessed on Nov. 3, 2014)
3 Buchanan, J. M. and Wagner, R.E. (1977), “Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes”, 
New York, Academic Press, pp.92-98
4 Cukierman, A. and Meltzer, A. (1989), “A Political Theory of Government Debt and
Deficits in a Neo-Ricardian Framework”, American Economic Review, 79(4), pp.713-732
5 Weingast, B., K. Shepsle and C. Johnsen (1981), “The political economy of benefits and
costs: A neoclassical approach to distributive politics”, Journal of Political Economy 89: pp. 642-664
6 von Hagen, J.(1992), “Budgeting procedure and fiscal performance in the European
Communities”, Economic Paper No. 96, Commission of European Communities
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7 Kopits, G. and J. Craig (1998), “Transparency in government operations”, IMF
Occasional Paper No. 158,pp.5-12
8 Kopits, George and Steven Symansky (1998),"Fiscal Policy Rules", IMF Occasional Paper No.162
9 Marbeffe, W.,van Aarlem, B., van der Wielen, W., and Vereeck, L.(2011), “The Impact of Fiscal Rules on 
Public Finances in the Euro Area”, CESiFO DICE REPORT, Autum 2011, pp.18-25
10See Kubo(2003), “OOSHUU TOOKOO RON(in Japanese, The Theory of European Integration ), Minerva 
Shoboo, pp.121-127
11See the Commissions website;
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/the_european_semester/index_en.htm
(Accessed on Nov. 3, 2014)
12Its former name is “Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance”. See the Commission’s website;
http://www.eurozone.europa.eu/euro-area/topics/treaty-on-stability,-coordination-and-governance-(tscg)/
(Accessed on Nov. 3, 2014)
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